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Abstract 
Promoting human rights at an international level implies state cooperation for 
establishing agreements concerning the improvement of measures which are imposed in this 
field, as well as adopting certain conventions related to the new dimensions of rights or even 
with the new human rights.   
Human rights represent an extraordinarily complex branch of law, which embodies 
both internal order as well as international order, defining and adding up a set of rights, 
liberties and obligations of people- some against the other, of the states to defend and 
promote these rights, of the entire international community to survey the observance of those 
rights and liberties in each country – which permits the intervention by means of public 
international law in those situations in which these right would have normally been breached 
in a certain state. Thus, the principle of state sovereignty may not be opposed to the necessity 
of protecting human rights, in order to justify to the international community the infringement 
of these rights inside states.  
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Introduction 
From the beginning of mankind and over its evolution, scientists, wisemen, 
clairvoyant, have contributed to affirming some rights of the individual in his relation with 
power1, formulating realistic law principles such as: liberty, equality, solidarity, which, 
gradually led to the attenuation of brute force in social relations, in favour of emancipating 
man. 
Consecrating at an international level the defense of human rights is based on the 
state acceptance of the fact that protecting these rights can not be left to the discretion of 
every individual state, as the sovereignty of the state represents the grounds for protecting the 
rights of their own citizens2 and other persons from its territory or that enter in contact with 
the state, and not by breaching them.  
 
                                                 
1
 In China, Confucius considered man to be the center of his thinking system, indicating justice and humanity as 
main virtues. 
2
 “It is an elementary principle of international law which authorises the state to protect its prejudiced citizens by 
means of contrary acts to the international law committed by another state and for which they could not obtain 
any redress using ordinary means of appeal. By embracing the cause of one of its citizens and setting in motion 
the diplomatic or international legal action in its favour, this state is valuing his own right, the right to be 
observed in the person of its citizens, the international law” (The International Permanent Court of Justice, 
Mavrommatis Concessions in Palestina, Greece against the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Decision from 
30th of August 1924 – in Miga-Beşteliu R.& Brumar C., Protecţia internaţională a drepturilor omului, 4th 
edition reviewed, Universul Juridic Publishing, Bucharest, 2008, p. 14). 
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Human rights and state sovereignity 
The idea that the human being possesses, by its nature, certain valid rights even if they 
do not meet or partially meet dispositions of positive legal laws – has appeared from ancient 
times, being affirmed and argumented by the stoic religion, as well as by the scholars who 
lived in all the historic times, sometimes being inspired from the religious dogma, and other 
times only from the light of ration. 
Transposed in the legal framework, the concept of „human rights” firstly designates 
“man’s subjective rights” 3 which define its position in relation to public power, but it also 
represents a veritable legal institution, a set of internal and international legal norms which 
target as regulatory aim the promoting and ensurance of human rights and liberties, his 
defense against the abuses of the state and perils of any nature4. 
By means of the international conventions in the field of human rights the states 
principally are compelled, not towards other states, but to individuals, who are the 
beneficiaries of the international regulations. Thus, we are not facing a contractual issue, but 
an objective one that is a part of the international public order. Nevertheless, some rights are 
not exclusively consacrated by international conventional regulations, but also by regulation 
embodying a customary character, and the most important rights (the right to life, repression 
of genocide) have a ius cogens value, the obligation of observing them being imperative5. 
Initially, human rights have been considered to form a legal institution of the public 
international law, but in the present one may affirm that a distinct branch of the international 
law already exists and the international regulations in this field, forming the international law 
of human rights6. 
The international law of human rights represents a distinct legislative assembly ( such 
as the Law of Treaties, Law of the Sea, Diplomatic Law, etc) being governed by the 
fundamental principles of international law, even if it also presents certain specific 
characteristics7.  
As a distinct branch of public international law, international law of human rights 
embodies all the international legal regulations that target the protection of the human being, 
its aim being the defense of human rights8, and the date of 10 December 1948, when the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaimed, marks the moment of birth of the 
modern law of human rights9. 
The idea that the international law of human rights, as a set of principles and norms 
that govern state cooperation regarding the promotion of human rights evidenced in the 
doctrine does not reflect an universal consensus, with a unitary, immutable model which is 
generally10. The axiological process generating human rights is developed in an expanded or 
narrowed framework, as in each historical period, the valorisation processes at a national level 
coexists and is mutually influences with what is achieved at the international level; the 
important fact is that when such a process has acquired an international validation, the 
respective values cannot be any longer „denied” on the local level11. 
The axiological „conglomeration achieved around a fundamental value is legally 
expressed by a set of norms which define at the veritable international level juridical 
                                                 
3
 Năstase A., Destinul contemporan al dreptului internaţional. Reflecţii dintr-o perspectivă europeană, 
Universitatea “Nicolae Titulescu” Publishing, Bucharest, 2004, p. 210. 
4
 Scăunaş S., Dreptul internaţional al drepturilor omului, All Beck Publishing, Bucharest, 2003, pp. 3-4. 
5
 See also Craven M., “Legal Differentiation and the Concept of the Human Rights Treaty in International Law”, 
11 European Journal of International Law, 2000, pp. 500-504. 
6
 Sieghart P., The International Law of Human Rights, Oxford, 1983, p. 13-17. 
7
 Năstase A., [3], p. 213. 
8
 Scăunaş S., [4], p. 4. 
9
 Cloşcă I., Suceavă I., Tratat de drepturile omului, Europa Nova Publishing, Bucharest, 1995, p. 38. 
10
 Năstase A., [3], p. 211. 
11
 Conforti B., Diritto internazionale, 3rd Edition, in Editoriale Scientifico, Naples, 1987, p. 203. 
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institutions. Thus, an initial legal consecration is accomplished at an international level, the 
rational norm adopted by the states, subsequently forms what is called “human rights with 
variable contents”12. By means of these contents which are differenced from the specific of 
every state, thus achieving the guarantee and effective protection of rights13. 
Embodying principles, mechanisms, procedures which are related to the domestic 
legal order, but also to the international order, the branch of human rights presents a divalent 
character, being in the same time an institution of domestic law, integrated in constitutional 
norms, but also a branch of the international law, that configurates the characteristics of a 
juridical principle applicable in state relations14. 
In the domain of human rights, we have the subsidiarity rule of consecrating and 
international guaranteeing of rights, compared to consecrating and guaranteeing them in the 
domestic plan, the international level of human rights protection representing a minimal 
standard for states that can guarantee an insured protection of human rights at a national level. 
Thus, the international protection structure intervenes only in a subsidiary manner, when state 
mechanisms are unsatisfactory – observing the domestic remedies, before the intimation of a 
body, being mandatory.  
The relation between public international law and domestic law has concerned the 
legal system even since the 19th century, in the doctrine two currents being formulated: the 
monistic theories that, considering the domestic law and the international law as components 
of a unique legal system, affirms whether the primacy of the first or of the latter15 and the 
dualistic theory which states that both the domestic and the international law are legal and 
independent phenomena. 
In internal systems that adopted the monistic conception with the primacy of the 
international law, the international norms concerning human rights may be applied directly, 
on the condition that they embody a precise and complete content, without the necessity of 
subsequent acts of transposition or application. Moreover, the states participating to 
international conventions concerning human rights must observe the commitments undertaken 
by these conventions regarding the defense of persons and guaranteeing the above-mentioned 
rights, as well as referring to the cooperation with international bodies they adhered to 
(reports, notifications, enforcements of judgements, etc.)16. 
International regulation concerning human rights are not relation to the subordination 
law as, like every regulation of public international law, it is developed in the framework of 
international society,the coordination law being specific to the later 17. 
However, it can be stated that they are not exclusively related to the coordination law 
either, as it targets to form a protection law of the individual. The incapacity of general public 
international law to ensure this defense function, leads to the formation of specific 
international regulations, in the case of international protection of human rights, regulations 
which impose to exceed the classical conception of international law.   
Taking into consideration the enormous importance for humanity to observe the rights 
of all humans, in the specialized legal literature there are ample debates referring to the 
relations among state sovereignty and „internationalization” of human rights, two main 
                                                 
12
 Ruiz G.A., The UN Declaration on Friendly Relations and the System of the Sources of International Law, 
Sijthoff, Alphen, 1979, p. 277. 
13
 Năstase A., [3], p. 208. 
14
 Duculescu V., Protecţia juridică a drepturilor omului, Lumina Lex Publishing, Bucharest, 2008, p. 24. 
15
 See also Hegel, Principes de la philosophie du droit, 6th edition, Dalloz Publishing, Paris, 1970, pp. 216 and 
fol. and Enciclopedia ştiinţelor filosofice. Filosofia spiritului, Academia Publishing, Bucharest, 1966, p. 359. 
The superiority and primacy of the international law of international legal order compared to the domestic law is 
sustained among others by Kelsen H., La thèorie pure du droit, II-eme edition, Paris, 1962, p. 444, as well as by 
Rousseau Ch., Droit international public, Dalloz Publishing, Paris, 1970, pp. 16 and fol.  
16
 See Barre J., L’integration politique externe, Université Catholique, Louvain, 1969, p. 82.  
17
 See Sudre F., Drept european şi internaţional al drepturilor omului, Polirom Publishing, 2006, p. 33. 
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tendencies being evidenced: on the one hand that of diminishing the significance and 
importance of sovereignty in international contemporary relations, and on the other that of 
finding legal solutions to „avoid” the effects of sovereignty in the domain of human rights. 
Nevertheless, some authors claim that sovereignty represents an outdated political and legal 
phenomenon, a residue of competence left to the states by the international law, a perilous, 
unacceptable dogma.  
In the doctrine18, the theory according to which sovereignty is the one that created 
international rights was stated, and it “recognizes sovereignty as its fundament and basic 
principle”. 
In opposition with this theory, there is also an opinion19 that pleads in favour of 
redefining the relation between state sovereignty and international law, showing that it 
possesses an originating status having existed prior to state sovereignty and international law, 
whose source of legal qualification is not pre-existent to certain international regulations.  
By analysing the international realities we are led to the conclusion that, in fact, state 
interdependence cannot be contrasted to sovereignty, which does not represent an obstacle for 
international cooperation, including the domain of human rights defense, but an „avouchment 
of what could bear the name of state dignity”20. International contemporary life evidences the 
necessity of sovereign states having to coexist; however, sovereignty cannot be absolute in the 
frame of international relations, just because it must ensure tolerance and observance for the 
sovereignty of other states. Nevertheless, the right to observance was considered by the 
classical doctrine as being one of the fundamental state. 
The existence of international treaties in the field of human rights does not stand for a 
limitation of state sovereignty21, as the latter are considered the expression of the state’s will 
to develop cooperation in this domain. By the conclusion of agreements in the sphere of 
human rights, states aim to determine the frame and forms of their cooperation in this domain, 
and not to abandon their sovereignty 22; in this way,  “the state independence is not 
compromised, or the sovereignty achieved by undertaking certain international obligations”23.  
In respecting the regulations of public international law concerning the promoting and 
protection of human rights, there is nothing to affect sovereignty of the states in cause or the 
distinction between international and domestic law24. 
The question whether human rights are excluded from the domestic state jurisdiction 
to joint the international jurisdiction is not justified, as there is a functional separation 
between the domestic legal order and the international one, in the sense that some aspects 
concerning human right protection and promotion remain in the competence of the state – 
even in the cases in which the states have become parties to international treaties in the 
domain – while other aspects are a part of the international order25. 
It cannot be contested that every states decide upon its internal issues, but in the same 
time the right and obligation of the United States to supervise international policies when they 
can affect the global community is recognized, in these policies being also included the issue 
                                                 
18
 Arand R. P., “Sovereign Equality of States in International Law”, in Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit 
International, vol. 197, 1986, p. 42. 
19
 Dinh N.Q., Pellet A., Dailier P., Droit international public, Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 
Paris, 2003, p. 76. 
20
 Colliard, C.A., Institutions des relations internationales, Dalloz Publishing, Paris, 1974, p. 108. 
21
 See Titulescu N., “Dinamica păcii”, in the volume Documente diplomatice, Politic Publishing, Bucharest, 
1967, p. 298. 
22
 Ruize D., Droit international public, Dalloz Publishing, Paris, 1987, p. 62. 
23
 Dinh N.Q., Pellet A., Dailier P., [19], pp. 385 and fol. 
24
 Ruiz G.A., “Human Rights and Non-intervention”, in Helsinki Final Act, vol. 157, in Recueil des Cours de 
l'Académie de Droit International, 1977, p. 291. Van Boven Th., United Nations and Human Rights. A critical 
Approach, New York, 1985, p. 122, quoted by Năstase A., [3], p. 189. 
25
 Ermacora F., “Human Rights and Domestic jurisdiction”, vol. 124, in Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de 
Droit International, 1968, p. 431. 
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of human rights. As a result, a state that does not fulfil its international obligations undertaken 
cannot invoke the principle of national sovereignty to justify having not fulfilled the above-
mentioned obligations, even if the liabilities are referring to the rights of its own citizens26.  
The principle of sovereignty, of non-intervention etc, cannot be invoked as a ground 
for non-observance of human rights, as not observing human rights cannot ultimately lead to 
the contesting of state sovereignty27, even if these must comply to the norms they have 
conventionally accepted, being obligatory on the basis of the principle pacta sunt servada, or 
on the grounds of international customary law or ius cogens28. 
States have not lost their jurisdictional attributions concerning human rights29, but 
these are more and more receptive to the decisions of international bodies. The application of 
international courts and bodies founded by treaties continuously influences the states’ 
jurisprudence, including the American one30, even if legal remedies of these international 
courts, against breaching human rights, are subsidiary31.  
 
Conclusions 
Although the authority of the state is clearly recognized – reflected in the condition of 
those who claim the infringement of human rights to international courts, to exhaust the 
internal ways of attack32 before addressing an international body, but also in the attention that 
bodies for implementing treaties from the domain of human rights defense is granted to the 
possibility of appreciating the national legal system – the application of international bodies 
clearly influenced the content of the national law of the majority of democratic states, 
concerning human rights.   
The evolution of limitations brought to sovereignty also generates obligations to 
undertake, according to which, sates internationally respond not only for the acts 
accomplished against individuals, but also for not ensuring the adequate protection or reaction 
in cases of human rights infringement. Thus, the sovereignty concept has not become in any 
way obsolete, but it evolved to a point where states are liable for their subjects, for other 
persons, as well as towards the international community33. Nevertheless, when governments 
are convinced that certain national values or traditions are threatened by the extending 
application of standards concerning human rights and are restricting certain rights by means 
of normative acts which are clear and predictable for the one affected, such limitations are 
generally accepted if they are justified by the necessity of ensuring public order or other 
similar reasons34. 
 
                                                 
26
 Micu D., Garantarea drepturilor omului, All Beck Publishing, Bucharest, 1998, p. 11. 
27
 Duculescu V., [14], p. 63. 
28
 Orlin Th. S., “Evoluţia limitărilor suveranităţii pentru o nouă comunitate globală «Limitarea Leviathanului 
prin dreptul internaţional»” (Second part), Romanian Journal of International Law, no. 9, 2009, p. 8. 
29
 Cassin R., Père de la Dèclaration Universalle des Droits de L’Homme, Librairie Académique Perrin, Mensul-
sur-l’Estrée, 1998, p. 230.  
30
 See Janis M.W, International Law, Fifth Edition, Aspen Publishers, Walter Kluwer Law&Business, 2008, p. 
106, who quotes the case Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2 d 876 (2 d Civ. 1980), this constituting an important 
example of applying international law of human rights in the American jurisprudence; international customary 
law is used in applying Allien Torts Statute to a victim of torture. Judge Kaufman decided that „from the 
examination of the sources of international and customary law, the state application, the jurisprudence and 
doctrine – we conclude that torture accomplished by the authorities is presently prohibited in the nation law”. 
31
 See Nowak M., Introduction to the International Human Rights Regime, Bill Academia Publishers (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers) Leiden, 2003, pp. 63-64.  
32
 In conformity with the art. 35 from the European Human Rights Conventions, „The Courts cannot be notified 
until after the exhaust of domestic remedies, as it is understood from the principles of international laws 
generally acknowledged”… 
33
 See Glendon M.A., A World made New; Eleanor Roosevelt and The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
Random House, New York, 2002, pp. 59-60.  
34
 Nowak M., [31], pp. 59-60.  
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